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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to emphasize that the goal of 
Criminal Justice System in terms of fraud and other corrupt 
practices by company (such as bribery), one of the way is to 
avoid far-reaching consequences, including debarment of 
the company from the local government. Notwithstanding its 
immensity, corruption can cause damage to the reputation 
of the business and jeopardize its profitability. To prevent 
this from happening, this study will examine the possibility 
for companies to conduct a self-report mechanism in 
relation to fraudulent act of bribery, as a way to change 
company’s leadership culture. By conducting self-report 
mechanism (as have been implemented in U.S. through the 
FCPA and U.K. through the UK Bribery act), companies are 
expected to whistleblow its own wrongful acts to relevant 
authority, so that their employees are no longer committing 
fraud, knowing that the company will report them. While 
on the other hand, the company will gain benefit (such as 
monetary recoveries, leniency) in conditions that will be 
explained further in this paper.
BACKGROUND
Surrounded by various types of fraudulent acts 
committed in the corporate industry, one of the prevalent 
issues are bribery and corruption. According to Asia 
Pacific (APAC) Fraud Survey 2015 respondent, bribery and 
corruption remain frequent throughout APAC, with 6 out of 
10 respondents agreeing that bribery and corruption happens 
1 The Most Inspiring Paper of National Call For Paper ACFE Indonesia Chapter 
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widely in their countries.1 Bribery is defined 
by the Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions which was enacted in 
1997,2 as the offering, promising or giving of 
something in order to influence a public official 
in the execution of his/her official duties. 
Bribes can take the form of money, or other 
pecuniary advantages, such as a membership in 
an exclusive club,  a promise of a scholarship 
for a child, or non-pecuniary advantages, such 
as favourable publicity. Similar definitions 
concerning bribery of corporate employees 
are used in private sector codes of conduct.3 
Therefore, this paper will elaborate further 
bribery and corruption perpetrated by public 
officials and how the legislation and methods 
to prevent and eradicate bribery and corruption 
aforementioned. 
In projection, numerous cases can be 
found throughout Asia Pacific region. For 
instance, countries with low level of corruption 
such as Singapore, there are still 103 cases 
of corruption being investigated by Corrupt 
Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in 20184, 
on the other hand in the Philippines, which 
known as a country with high level bribery 
and corruption; projected on its position as the 
101 out of 176 countries on the Transparency 
Corruption Index 20165- bribery and corruption 
are indeed still a popular crime perpetrated 
by both public officials and foreign officials; 
protrude in popular case such as Chairman 
1 Asia Pacific Fraud Survey 2015.“Fraud and Corruption - 
Driving Away Talent ?”
2  See OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions. 1997 
3  OECD. “The Fight against Bribery and Corruption.” Policy 
Brief, September 2000, pg.3.
4 The Straight Times, Lydia Lam. “All-time Low of 103 
Corruption Cases Registered for Investigation in 2017: CPIB.”
5  E.V., Transparency International. “Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2016.” Transparency International - The Global Anti-
Corruption Coalition. Accessed May 26, 2018. https://www.
transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_
index_2016.
Abalos and its US$13 million project.6 
Accordingly, familiar cases can be found on 
other APAC countries especially developing 
countries throughout the region. 
Both external and internal forces have 
pushed countries to draft anti-corruption 
strategies in the APAC region.7 Majority of 
APAC region have established regulation that 
criminalise bribery of domestic public officials 
and foreign officials. For instance; Singapore’s 
primary anti-corruption  legislation which sets 
out in the Prevention of Corruption Act enacted 
in 1960 and revised on 1993,8 regulated bribery 
committed by members of parliament or other 
public bodies in its Article 11 and 12.9 Similarly, 
Philippines had also enacted a legislation 
concerning acts of bribery, i.e. Anti-Graft and 
Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act 3019 jo. 
Revised Penal Code on bribery).10 Another 
example is Japan, which relies on Article 198 
of their Criminal Code to regulate bribery to 
Japan’s public officials and foreign officials,11 
thus Japan also revised the Act on Punishment on 
Organized Crime and Control Crime Proceeds 
to forbid conspiracies by groups of two or more 
people to commit certain crimes, including 
giving and receiving bribes.12 Therefore, it can 
be concluded that the recent development on 
legislation regarding criminalisation against 
both local and foreign officials has been 
6  Cayabyab, Marc Jayson. “Ex-Comelec Chief Appeals 
Anew ‘resurrected’ Graft Case.” Inquirer News Duterte 
Formally Asks Congress to Extend Martial Law in Mindanao 
Until End of 2018 Comments. Accessed May 25, 2018. http://
newsinfo.inquirer.net/904037/ex-comelec-chief-appeals-
anew-resurrected-graft-case.
7 Manandhar, Narayan. “Anti-corruption Strategies: 
Understanding What Works, What Doesn’t and Why?” Edited 
by Elodie Beth-Seo and Samuel De Jaegere. Compiled by 
UNDP.
8  See Singapore, Prevention of Corruption Act 1993 amended 
on 1960. 
9  See Singapore, Prevention of Corruption Act 1993 amended 
on 1960, art. 11 & 12 
10  See Philippines, Republic Act No. 3019 regarding Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 
11  See Japan, Penal Code of 1999
12  See Japan, Penal Code,  Act 136 of 1999 jo. Act. 67 of 2017
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included inside the amendments of relating 
regulations. 
However, a real push came with the entry 
into force of the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2005. As 
most of the APAC countries have signed and 
ratified the UNCAC which covers the issues 
regarding bribery and corruption, mentioned 
above are the projections in countries that have 
been followings on what’s been stated inside 
the UNCAC itself. UNCAC specifically stated 
bribery acts which can be charge for criminal 
offences on Article 1613 regarding bribery made 
by the public officials and Article 2114 regarding 
bribery caused by the private sector. Thus, 
although this convention had covers most of the 
act of bribery and corruption, challenges still 
appears among its implementation in countries. 
Indonesia has become the largest 
economy in Southeast Asia and the world’s 10th 
largest economy (in terms of purchasing power 
parity) due to rapid economic progress over 
the past twenty years.15 The progress shows 
significantly in 2014 where Indonesia has an 
increase in gross national income per capita 
from US$560 in 2000 to US$3,630 in 2014.16 
Consequently, the economy growth also comes 
with another side of the coin,  the growth of 
corruption issues inside the country which 
hindered the possibility of further economic 
growth. Although various efforts has been made 
by the national governments to implement the 
UNCAC , which include development and 
revision of relevant legislation and regulatory 
frameworks, formulation of long and medium 
term national anti- corruption strategies and 
action plans, bureaucracy reforms, and the 
13  See United Nations, United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption, Art. 16 
14  See United Nations, United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption, Art. 21
15  UNODC country program : indonesia 2017-2020, https://
www.unodc.org/documents/indonesia/publication/2017/
UNODC_Country_Programme_2017_-_2020.pdf
16  World Bank, Country Overview, Last Updated 5 April 2016, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/overview 
establishment of powerful national anti-
corruption institutions such as the Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK) and anti-
corruption courts.17 Through the enactment of 
Law No. 31 of 1999 amended by Law No. 20 
of 200118 regarding Eradication of Criminal 
Acts of Corruption (“Undang-Undang Tindak 
Pidana Korupsi”) which aim to criminalizes 
major acts of corruption – including active 
and passive bribery, abuse of office and 
extortion, however in practice that the law 
itself  are lacking of enforcement and do not 
address facilitation payments.19  In addition, 
the establishment of KPK as an independent 
body which aim to combat the extraordinary 
crime of corruption in Indonesia (according to 
Law No. 31 of 1999 as amended by Law No. 
20 of 2001 on The Eradication of Corruption, 
Law No. 28 of 1999 on Corruption-Free 
State Governance, and Law No. 8 of 2010 on 
Combating Money Laundering Crime - relating 
to corruption actions) are enacted in order to 
decrease the number of corruption inside the 
country. Nonetheless, KPK also faced several 
challenges both externally and internally due 
to its operation. Externally, the newly passed 
law of the Anti-Corruption Court poses new 
challenges to KPK. The law requires that 
in some regions should be established Anti-
Corruption Courts, compared to current existing 
condition with only one Anti-Corruption 
Court in Jakarta. This new condition would 
pose problems of technical coordination and 
supervision because KPK does not have branch 
offices in those regions.20 Regarding internal 
issues, there are two significant challenge that 
are faced by KPK; the lack of human resources 
and facility  to operate are not feasible for its 
operation.21     
17  UNODC country program : indonesia 2017-2020
18 See Indonesia, Law No. 31 Year 199 as amended by Law 
No. 20 Year 2001 on Corruption Eradication.
19 https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-
profiles/indonesia/
20  Ibid.
21  Ibid. 
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In consequence, these efforts might 
seems have improved the situation, nevertheless 
significant challenges still remains. There 
are several significant challenges that needs 
to be highlighted regarding this issue;22 1) 
administrative decentralization in which the 
system has introduced new actors and changed 
the modus operandi of corruption at the local 
level, increasing the opportunities/incentives 
for officials to behave corruptly. Local 
governments enjoy wide discretionary powers 
and control over the application of more than 
50% of the government budget including 
over resources from mineral and timber, 
without having proper internal and/or external 
accountability mechanisms in place. Resources 
are transferred to local governments under a 
revenue sharing scheme, and they represent 
up to 80% of the total revenue collected by 
these jurisdictions. (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2012); 
2) rising incentives for payment of bribery 
and recoil by private companies (foreign and 
national) with low level monitoring system in 
which the growth of economy of the nation 
also rise the bribery and corruption cases even 
though its being monitorize by KPK, however 
challenges that are being faced by KPK 
mentioned above are inevitable 23; 3) weak 
accountability mechanism regarding related 
cases, which projected on law enforcement 
institutions suffer from limited financial and 
human resources, political interference, and 
vulnerability to bribery, among others. Even 
institutions which at the national level have 
improved their performance in the fight against 
corruption, such as the Audit Institution (BPK) 
and KPK, still have restricted activities at the 
local level (Freedom House, 2011).24
Hence, we could conclude that we are 
indeed in need of a viable solution to ease the 
22 https://www.u4.no/publications/causes-of-corruption-in-
indonesia/pdf
23  UNODC country program, available at https://www.unodc.
org.
24 https://www.u4.no/publications/causes-of-corruption-in-
indonesia/pdf
responsibility of prosecutor to investigate cases 
of bribery by implementing the self-report 
system.
CONTENT
1. THEORETICAL BASIS
Act of bribery as a form of corrupt 
practice is often associated with harsh 
punishments under criminal law. However, the 
question that should be answered in sanctioning 
acts of bribery is not only that “how harsh should 
the perpetrators be punished?”, rather it should 
also answer “how do we handle the crime of 
bribery to positively impact the society?”. We 
believe that the answer to the latter question 
should be constructed from the theory of 
criminal justice, which concerns the delivery 
of justice to perpetrators of criminal offences.25 
In particular, we will discuss the purposes of 
punishment under the criminal justice theory, 
i.e., retribution, protection, deterrence and 
rehabilitation.26 In sanctioning criminal acts, 
the theory of criminal justice seeks to balance 
the 4 elements above in order to best handle the 
criminal. 
In relation to bribery, one of the 
challenges in enforcing criminal law to 
the perpetrators is the absence of concrete 
evidence, and inability to detect whether 
such an action had been committed. In this 
regard, we propose the solution of self-report 
by companies in exchange for a more lenient 
sanction (in appropriate cases) to ease the 
burden of prosecutor in investigating crime of 
bribery. However, this solution does come with 
a dilemma: is it justifiable to reduce the effect 
of deterrence imposed by harsh punishment 
in exchange for information? To answer this, 
we must not overlook the benefit of self-
report, that is to ease the job of prosecutors 
25 George F. Cole, C.E. Smith, Christina DeJong, Criminal 
Justice in America, 9th ed, (Cancage Learning, 2016), at 5.
26 David C. May, Kevin I. Minor, Corrections and the Criminal 
Justice System, (Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2007), Chapter 2, 
at 29.
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in the investigation. This is critical, because 
any information of bribery would unlikely 
surface without being reported by the persons 
involved, given that they are in control of the 
information.27 Other benefits that should not 
be overlooked is the increased opportunity of 
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation itself focuses on 
how to rectify the relationship between criminal 
offender (in this case, giver and receiver of 
bribes) with the community in general that has 
been jeopardized when the value upheld by 
community had been breached by the crime 
committed.28 Another facet of rehabilitation 
is to eliminate the cause of crime committed 
by the offender to prevent future violation,29 
which we believe could be achieved by the 
mechanism of self-report. Given that one of 
the contributing factor to corporate bribery 
is the lack of disciplinary actions and other 
internal enforcement measures by company. 
Once company self-report the act of bribery, it 
would send a message that the company does 
not tolerate not it protects the perpetrators of 
bribery offence, thereby preventing bribery to 
be committed in the future. 
2. SELF-REPORT MECHANISM UNDER 
THE BRIBERY LAWS AROUND THE 
WORLD
Self-Report mechanism has been 
practiced by several countries in order to 
prevent, sanction, and mitigate the risk of 
bribery by companies. In this paper, we will 
discuss the practice of self-report in the United 
States and United Kingdom under their relevant 
legislation which could be used as an example 
of successful implementation of self-report 
mechanism.
27  Susan Rose-Ackermann, “Corruption and Criminal Law”, 
Forum on Crime and Society 2, vol. 2, 2002, at 7.
28  See A. Duff, Theories of Criminal Law, ed.2, (Stanford, 
2005).
29  Ibid.
A. THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT (FCPA) 1977
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA), enacted in 1977,30 is enforced dually by 
the Department of Justice (and its chief FCPA 
investigative arm, the FBI) and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, in which both of 
them have intensified their ongoing efforts to 
identify and prosecute anyone who violate the 
FCPA, either criminally or administratively.31 
The FCPA:32 1) Makes it illegal for U.S. persons, 
real or corporate, or third parties acting on their 
behalf,33 foreign companies registered with the 
SEC, and foreign companies or persons that 
commit an act in furtherance of an improper 
payment or offer while in the United States, 
to bribe foreign officials (that is, provide the 
officials with ‘‘anything of value’’) in order to 
‘‘obtain or retain business,’’; and 2) Mandates 
recordkeeping and internal-control standards 
for publicly held corporations registered under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The FCPA was designed to go as far as 
ethical standards would demand and that its 
cost of administration are sufficient means of 
inducing, or compelling ethical behaviour from 
U.S. business firms.34
30 Robert N. Holt, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
(Virginia: Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute, 1981), 
at 73.
31 Funk, T. Markus (September 10, 2010). “Getting What They 
Pay For: The Far-Reaching Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
‘Whistleblower Bounty’ Incentives on FCPA Enforcement”. 
White Collar Crime Report. Bureau of National Affairs. 5 (19): 
1.
32 Ibid., at 2.
33 The FCPA also claims expansive territorial jurisdiction 
for itself. Consider, in this context, the FCPA’s ‘‘alternative’’ 
nationality-based jurisdiction, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g) and 
78dd-2(i); the FCPA’s jurisdiction over foreign companies 
that are not issuers but that commit an act in furtherance of 
a prohibited payment within the United States, see 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78dd-3(a); and the FCPA’s jurisdiction over any ‘‘issuer,’’ 
‘‘domestic concern,’’ officer, director, employee, or agent 
of such issuer or domestic concern, or stockholder acting 
on behalf of such issuer or concern, who makes use of any 
instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of any 
improper payment or offer of payment, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd- 
1(a) and 78dd-2(a).
34 W. Michael Reisman, Folded Lies (1979).
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FCPA Provisions: Anti-Bribery and 
Accounting
FCPA attempts to eliminate bribery of 
foreign officials by U.S. corporate officials and 
their agents through both an anti-bribery and an 
accounting provision.35  The FCPA mandates 
that corporate records contain accurate 
statements concerning the true purpose of all 
payments made by the company.36 The law 
makes it a crime for the bribery of any foreign 
government official in return for assistance in:37 
1) Obtaining or retaining business, or directing 
business to any particular person; 2) Influencing 
a foreign government official to do or to omit an 
act in violation of his duty; and 3) Influencing 
a foreign government official to affect an act or 
decision by a foreign government.
The first provision criminalizes 
the bribery of foreign politicians,38 and the 
second creates a statutory requirement for 
any corporations subject to SEC regulation 
to develop an accurate record keeping and 
accounting.39 The FCPA can be read to require 
corporate disclosure of any illegal payment, as 
the second provision’s intention is to intensify 
the reliability of required report. Any illegal 
payments made by subordinates should be 
known by corporate management. To eliminate 
such illegality, corporate management should 
introduce internal controls, because the failure 
to do so might results in significant criminal 
penalties for the individual officers or directors 
as well as for the corporate entity.40
While the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) is responsible for handling bribery 
violations of the FCPA, the Securities and 
35 Porrata-Doria, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977: Repeating the Mistakes of the Past, (New Jersey: 
Rutgers L. R., 1985), 29.
36 Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(a).
37 Ibid.
38 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
213, § 103, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78dd 
(1976)).
39 Ibid., § 102 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78q(b) (1976)).
40 Ibid.
Exchange Commission (SEC) handles 
accounting violations. It is interesting to note 
that it is not a crime under the FCPA for an 
American company to pay bribes in a country 
where bribes are not illegal.41 FCPA’s anti-
bribery provision is expected to produce 
accountability for companies, because in order 
to avoid criminal accountability, companies 
should conduct self-reporting, self-enforcing, 
and preventive mechanisms.42 In this case, 
corporate management as the whistleblower 
who provides “original” violation-related 
information of the FCPA.
Incentives on FCPA Enforcement: The 
Dodd-Frank Act 2010
In July 21, 2010, President Obama 
signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank 
Act: H.R. 4173) into law, made it available 
both potentially huge new cash incentives for 
whistleblowers as well as beefed-up protection 
against retaliation.43 This act provided a 
major boost to the U.S. government’s FCPA 
enforcement efforts.44 Foreign and domestic 
corporate “insiders” (including those at 
the parent and off-shore subsidiary levels), 
purported recipients of bribes, as well as 
corporate “outsiders” (such as family members 
and friends who happened upon relevant 
information), now have unparalleled financial 
incentives to come forward with evidence of 
possible FCPA violations.45
The expected results are twofold: A 
notable uptick in government-initiated FCPA 
41 Martin T. Biegelman, Daniel R. Biegelman, Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Guidebook: Protecting Your 
Organization from Bribery and Corruption, Wiley (2010), 24.
42 S. Rep. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Session 4 at 10 (1977).
43 Note that the Dodd-Frank Act contains identical 
whistleblower provision governing the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission. See Section 748.
44 Funk, T. Markus (September 10, 2010). “Getting What 
They Pay For.”, 3.
45 Section 922 enumerates a narrow category of individuals 
who are excluded from whistleblower award eligibility.
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enforcement actions and an increase in self-
disclosure by corporate entities. Companies 
will therefore need to update their anti-
corruption compliance programs, making 
internal reporting mechanisms efficient and 
attractive to potential tipsters who surely 
will be tempted by the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
considerable monetary incentives.46 Under the 
act, whistleblowers are now statutorily entitled 
to a minimum of 10 percent, and a maximum of 
30 percent, of all monetary recoveries made as 
a result of information (Section 922).47
FCPA Case Study: Siemens Aktiengesellschaft 
(Siemens AG)
On December 15, 2008, Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft and three of its subsidiaries 
pleaded guilty to violations and charges related 
to the FCPA.48 In connection with the cases 
brought by the U.S. Department of Justice, 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office, 
Siemens will pay a combined total of more 
than US$1.6 billion in fines, penalties and 
disgorgement of profits, including US$800 
million to U.S. authorities. The combines 
U.S. penalties represent the largest monetary 
sanction ever imposed in an FCPA.49
On March 12, 2001, Siemens became 
a listed company on the New York Stock 
Exchange, and thereby subject to U.S. 
regulatory and anti-bribery requirements.50 
Siemens’ Managing Board failed to respond to 
46 Funk, T. Markus (September 10, 2010). “Getting What 
They Pay For.”, 3.
47 In contrast, under the pre-Dodd-Frank Act regime, the 
largely unused SEC whistleblower program was far more 
limited, applying only to insider trading cases and restricting 
monetary reward to a maximum of 10 percent of the recovered 
funds.
48 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq. (2004).
49 The Largest FCPA settlement to date prior to the Siemens 
case was Baker Hughes US$44 million settlement with the 
DOJ and SEC in 2007.
50 Alexandra Wrage and Anne Richardson, Siemens AG--
Violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, (Cambridge: 
International Legal Materials, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2009), 232.
these regulatory requirements by implementing 
effective internal controls to detect and prevent 
violations of the FCPA. According to the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s charging papers,51 
the company had merely adopted a “paper 
program” that revolved around ineffective anti-
corruption circulars and policy promulgations. 
The criminal internal controls allegations 
were also based on specific substantive and 
structural deficiencies, including failures 
to:52 1) Establish a sufficiently empowered 
and competent compliance department and 
severely underfunded internal audit resources 
to support compliance efforts; 2) Implement 
sufficient anti-bribery compliance policies 
and procedures to control significant FCPA 
risks; 3) Appropriately investigate and 
respond to allegations of corrupt payments; 
4) Discipline employees involved in making 
corrupt payments; and 5) Implement sufficient 
accounting and finance controls.
Siemens’ investigation and settlement 
reinforces the latest trends in FCPA enforcement. 
The DOJ and the SEC continue to place 
significant weight on a company’s cooperation 
with the government. The DOJ sentencing 
memorandum53 repeatedly highlights 
Siemens’ “extraordinary” level of cooperation 
and remediation. In the press conference 
announcing the settlement, the DOJ’s Acting 
Assistant Attorney General Matthew Friedrich 
stressed that “Siemens’ cooperation, in a word, 
has been exceptional.”54 Siemens’ already 
staggering fines could have been significantly 
51 Statement of Offense, United States v. Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-367 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2008), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/siemens-ag-
stmt-offense.pdf 
52 Alexandra Wrage and Anne Richardson, Siemens AG, 233.
53 Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft et al. (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/siemens-sententing-
memo.pdf 
54  Matthew Friedrich, Acting Assistant United States Attorney 
General, Transcript of Press Conference Announcing Siemens 
AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Violations (Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-opa-1112.html. 
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greater if the company had not received credit 
for its cooperation efforts. In addition, the 
company’s level of cooperation may have saved 
the parent entity from charges for violating the 
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, which could 
have led to debarment from U.S. government 
contracts.55
B. UK Bribery Act  
i. Scope of UK Bribery Act: UK’s jurisdiction
The UK Bribery Act of 2010, which 
entered into force in 2011 is a legislation 
that governs the act of bribery (which is 
defined as giving or promising any benefit to 
public officials for the purpose of influencing 
their decision in the scope of their official 
capacity).56 Under Section 7, companies 
have the obligation to prevent bribery in 
their official capacity. The fulfillment of this 
obligation comes in many facets, one of which 
is to create an internal procedure to prevent. In 
relation to such procedure, Ministry of Justice 
had issued a Guidance About Procedures 
which Relevant Commercial Organisations can 
put into Place to Prevent Persons Associated 
with Them from Bribing of 2011 (Guidance 
on Bribery Prevention), whereby there are six 
core principles that the guidance promotes in 
order to prevent acts of bribery by company:57 
1) Proportionality; 2) Top-Level Commitment; 
3) Risk Assessment; 4) Due Diligence; 5) 
Communication and Training; 6) Monitoring 
and Review. In relation to the second principle 
promoted by Guidance on Bribery Prevention, 
one of the ways to establish non-tolerance 
towards bribery is by self-reporting any bribery 
committed by employees, subsidiaries and/
or other persons related to the company. The 
UK Bribery Act itself does not contain any 
55  Alexandra Wrage and Anne Richardson, Siemens AG, 234.
56  United Kingdom, Bribery Act of 2010, Chapter 23, 8 July 
2010.
57  See Ministry of Justice of United Kingdom, Guidance 
About Procedures which Relevant Commercial Organisations 
can put into Place to Prevent Persons Associated with Them 
from Bribing, 2011.
express provision on self-report by companies. 
However, such matter is regulated through 
various instruments, including: 1) Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements Code of Practice; 
2) Guidance on Corporate Prosecutions; and 
3) SFO/DPP Joint Prosecution Guidance on 
Bribery Act. The three instruments mainly 
provide that self-report may entail benefits 
for the company, such as: lighter sanction or 
in appropriate cases, no prosecution would be 
proceeded.58 However, the three instruments do 
not provide express provision on the extent of 
“lighter sanctions” as it would be analyzed on a 
case-by-case basis.
ii. Case study in UK
In practice, there are many cases 
where companies self-report the act of bribery 
committed by its employee or its subsidiary. 
For instance, in 2008 the Balfour Beatty 
PLC reported an act of bribery committed by 
its subsidiary to Egyptian officials and the 
subsequent falsing of accounting report. In that 
case, Balfour Beatty PLC paid £2.25 Million 
as a sanction for its unlawful conduct, without 
any proceedings before the criminal court.59 
This practice was recognized as a monumental 
precedent, as it was the first time for UK to 
acquire an alternative enforcement measure 
outside criminal courts to sanction crimes of 
bribery, where the costs of long-process of 
litigation could be avoided and leniency in 
sanction was granted to trigger more companies 
to self-report.60 Following this practice, in 
2009 the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) issued 
a guideline on self-report by company for act 
of bribery it committed. The guideline was an 
58  See Jonathan Brogden, “The Bribery Act of 2010 - The 
Dynamics of Self-Reporting”, 2016.
59  David Leigh, Rob Evans, “Balfour Beatty agrees to pay 
£2.25m over allegations of bribery in Egypt”,
ht tps://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/oct/07/
balfourbeatty.egypt accessed 30 May 2018
60  A.Raad, M. Thompson, K. Sandford, “Self-Reporting to 
the Authorities and Other Disclosure Obligations: The UK 
Perspective”, The Practitioner’s Guide to Global Investigation, 
(Global Investigation Review, 2017).
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attempt to encourage companies to self-report 
instances of overseas bribery by promoting the 
idea that ‘in appropriate cases’ such self-reports 
would receive a civil rather than a criminal 
penalty.61 However, in a revised statement of 
policy issued in 2014, there was a sea change 
of procedure, where SFO explicitly mentioned 
that it does not guarantee that prosecution 
will not be conducted against companies 
committing bribery, yet it must be assessed on 
case-by-case basis.62 However, it is should be 
noted that according to Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements Code of Practice (DPA Code), 
self-report on acts of bribery constitutes a 
cooperation, which could lead to a leniency 
in sanctioning with possibility of not being 
prosecuted, or negotiated civil settlements.63 
The DPA Code also specifies how self-report 
shall be conducted, i.e. the report should be 
filed in timely manner to allow prosecutor to 
investigate, and the report should be filed along 
with relevant evidences.64 
Subsequent to the enactment of UKBA 
and the following regulations, the number of 
self-report of bribery to the SFO doubled, as 
shown by the following figure:
Source: http://thebriberyact.com/
This shows that subsequent to the 
enactment of UKBA and other rules governing 
61  Serious Fraud Office, Guideline on Self-Report of 
Companies concerning Bribery, 2009. (The guideline is no 
longer publicly available).
62  Serious Fraud Office, Revised Policy Statement on 
Guidance on Company Self-Reporting, 2012.
63  Serious Fraud Office, Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
Code of Practice, 2013, at para 2.8.2.
64  Ibid, at para 2.8.2
the benefits for companies in conducting self-
report, companies are more incentivized to 
self-report the act of bribery.
3. THE ROLE OF HIGH-LEVEL MAN-
AGEMENT IN COMPANY IN IM-
PLEMENTING ANTI-FRAUD CUL-
TURE THROUGH SELF-REPORTING 
MECHANISM: OVERVIEW OF IN-
DONESIAN LAW
Fraud is a crime that often reported 
by third-party, taking up 42% of corporate 
misconduct reports.65 In combating such 
misconduct, there has to be a widespread 
culture that resists it and share values, norms, 
beliefs, and ethical practices that will allow the 
company to carry out its business in an honest 
and ethical way. A culture as such requires 
development constructed from the top down, 
and no better to proliferate the existence of an 
anti-fraud culture in a company than the ones 
in a position to ‘set the tone’ of the company.66 
This position falls into the board of executives 
that handles the operation of a company and 
thus is the group that has ultimate responsibility 
over the business and the way it is run.67 
The tone of an anti-fraud culture is built 
both by character of persons in the company 
structure and also by the internal framework 
that exists within the company to discourage 
such misconduct. The internal framework, 
often called “Fraud Policy”, may include 
measures such as company strategy, definition 
of fraud, prevention techniques, procedures of 
investigation and follow up. One way a Fraud 
Policy is implemented is in creating a system 
65  OECD, “Committing to Effective Whistleblower 
Protection: Highlights”, page 10. https://www.oecd.org/
corruption/Committing-to-Effective-Whistleblower-
Protection-Highlights.pdf, accessed 28 May 2018.
66  Nigel Iyar and Martin Samociuk, A Short Guide to Fraud 
Risk, (Surrey: Gower Publishing Ltd, 2010), p.29-32.
67  United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 
“Corporate Governance and Whistleblower Reform”, https://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-21-11/s72111-9.pdf, accessed 29 
May 2018.
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of reporting that exists in the hope of repressing 
misconduct. Leadership commitment is a key 
element in creating an effective self-reporting 
system that exists to protect and set forth anti-
retaliation systems. A system as such would 
then discourage acts of misconduct through 
encouraging a culture of ‘speaking up’.68 The 
challenge of an internal reporting system is in 
its incentive. Companies and its employees 
are unlikely willing to “speak up” because 
they are afraid of the repercussions.69 Board 
of executives take the lead in implementing 
this system, and to follow through and carry 
it out should there be cases of fraud reporting 
by its employees. The question then turns into 
what measures should the company take when 
a misconduct of fraud by a member of the 
company is then discovered. 
Generally, fraudulent act is regulated 
through Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana 
(Indonesian Penal Code), where police have 
the authority to investigate, save for cases of 
financial institution, where the authority is at 
Otoritas Jasa Keuangan.70 Oftentimes, cases of 
corporate fraud intersect with public officials 
and could lead to corruption charges, which 
then fall under the authority of the Attorney 
General Office (Kejaksaan Agung) and 
Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi 
Pemberantasan Korupsi).71 These entities, 
along with several other sectoral regulations 
make it possible to extend the criminal nature 
of fraud to the responsibility of a corporation or 
a legal entity. Such regulations that may apply 
68 Mara Lemos Stein, “Risk & Compliance 
Journal: Whistleblower: Companies Need to 
Encourage Speak-Up Culture”,https://blogs.wsj.com/
riskandcompliance/2017/12/14/whistleblower-companies-
need-to-encourage-speak-up-culture/, accessed 29 May 2018.
69 OECD, “Committing to Effective Whistleblower Protection: 
Highlights”, page 8. https://www.oecd.org/corruption/
Committing-to-Effective-Whistleblower-Protection-
Highlights.pdf, accessed 28 May 2018.
70  See Indonesia, Law No. 21 Year 2011 on Financial Services 
Authority
71  See Indonesia, Law No. 31 Year 199 as amended by Law 
No. 20 Year 2001 on Corruption Eradication.
include corporate frauds that moves in several 
specific fields.72 
In cases of bribery being the fraudulent 
action at hand, it is governed under several 
regulations depending on the specifications of 
the bribery conducted by a party. Generally, 
bribery that has been criminalized is directed 
towards bribery of government or court officials 
as seen under the Penal Code,73 bribery leading 
to corruption charges under the Corruption 
Eradication Law,74 bribery in money politics 
of public campaigns,75 and bribery of bank 
officials.76 The scope of bribery is then extended 
under Law No. 11 Year 1980 to include act of 
bribery towards any party that has the potential 
effect of endangering public interest.
Criminal action such as fraud under 
Indonesian Law is an offense that does not 
prerequisite a report to file charges against such 
action (delik biasa). In other words, there is no 
legal obligation or responsibility for any party 
to file a report on fraud. This is not only seen 
in reporting cases of fraud, but is seen in the 
general framework of compliance for private 
parties, such as corporations.77 This makes it 
difficult for the prosecutor to investigate the 
case. 
If companies are willing to comply 
through reporting fraudulent actions, then 
a framework that could protect them is the 
general framework of witness protection as the 
reporter (pelapor) and is applicable to natural 
72  See Indoneisa Law No. 8 Year 1999 on Consumer Protection, 
Art. 61; Indonesia, Law No. 32 Year 2009 on Environmental 
Protection and Management, Art. 116;  Indonesia, Law No. 7 
Year 2014 on Trading, Art. 107 and 115.
73 Indonesia, Penal Code, Articles 209, 210, 419, and 420.
74 Indonesia, Law No. 31 Year 199 as amended by Law No. 20 
Year 2001 on Corruption Eradication, Art. 5.
75 See Law No. 12 Year 2003, Law No. 23 Year 2003, and Law 
No. 32 Year 2004
76 Law No. 10 Year 1998
77 Andini H. Dewi and Christina N. Soela, “American 
Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia: A Compliance Road 
Map for Companies in Indonesia”, https://www.amcham.or.id/
fe/4901-a-compliance-road-map-for-companies-in-indonesia, 
accessed 30 May 2018.
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persons or legal persons such as corporations.78 
Another framework that will protect companies 
willing to go through self-reporting is under 
Supreme Court Circular Letter No. 4 Year 2011 
on Protection of Whistleblowers and Justice 
Collaborators. Neither an obligation nor a right, 
and not being an incentive or disincentive, the 
current framework relies heavily on the self-
motivation of companies to report by only 
providing limited and unspecified protection 
towards self-reporting.  Heavily reliance as such 
is dependent upon internal policies, culture and 
sense of responsibility of a company and its 
board of executives. Without the tone of anti-
fraud ringing in the corporations, this system 
runs the risk of being lenient towards corporate 
actions that may as well fall under fraud, and 
let it go undetected and unreported.
The regulatory framework in Indonesia 
differs to those of the United States. Under 
the FCPA, the role of Board of Executives in 
following through on fraud cases under its 
company is more prolific and clear-cut under the 
option of self-reporting provided by the FCPA as 
elaborated above. With its enforcement policies 
enacted by the US Department of Justice, 
disclosure of fraudulent behavior as bribery 
is given much more incentives to proliferate 
an anti-fraud culture.79 Such incentive then 
becomes the driving force of flourishing self-
reporting and compliance efforts, as the United 
States does not only rely on the goodwill and 
moral obligation of a corporation and its Board 
of Executives, but gives concrete and beneficial 
results in turn for cooperation that may push 
its executives to set the tone for an anti-fraud 
culture of the company.
4. MECHANISM OF THE SOLUTION
One of the pillar of law is legal certainty, 
which would translate to fair and standardized 
sanctioning in order to avoid disparity for 
78 Indonesia, Law No. 13 Year 2006 as amended by Law No. 
31 Year 2014 on Witness Protection, Art. 1 Point 9.
79 https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/
download
similar crimes. Therefore, the implementation 
of self-report by company requires clear 
mechanism to be put in place. As explained in 
Section 3 above, there are several instruments 
under Indonesian law which could be of a 
reference for the conduct of self-reporting in 
relation to bribery. However, given that there 
is an absence of clear mechanism, we propose 
a clear mechanism on self-report in relation to 
bribery as follows:
1. Internal Company Compliance Measures
The key to an effective external self-
reporting system to a relevant authority stems 
from effectiveness of internal compliance 
measures that build an anti-fraud environment 
and a “speak up” culture for the company itself. 
The way to set a uniform anti-fraud tone is for 
government/relevant authorities to set standards 
that ensure compliance policies are well-
designed. A general example of a compliance 
policy is set to assure that minimum safeguards 
are placed in companies in order to repress 
fraudulent action. Under relevant authority in 
Indonesia, this example of a compliance policy 
for fraud should be set - including, but not 
limited to measures regarding: code of conduct 
of employees; risk assessment of misconduct; 
internal incentive and disciplinary measures; 
company reporting system; and employee 
compliance training.
2. Filing the Report: Relevant Authorities, 
Benefits and other provisions
a. The scope of action
The proposed solution of self-report 
concerns about the act of bribery, which under 
Indonesian Law, as reflected in Law No. 31 of 
1999 concerning the Eradication of Criminal 
Act of Corruption as amended by Law No. 20 
of 2002 (“Corruption Law”) is giving gifts or 
promise to influence a public official in the 
execution of his official duty. In this regard, 
companies should be advised to self-report 
the bribery committed by their employees, 
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their subsidiaries, and/or other parties acting 
for and on behalf of the company, or persons 
under the supervision of the company. This 
is in line with the theory of negligence in 
corporate criminal liability, where companies 
are liable for criminal offence conducted by 
persons under their supervision as a result of 
their negligence.80
b. Reporting Procedures
In enforcing the self-report mechanisms 
to avoid any criminal accountability and 
any fraudulent act being committed by 
subordinates, company management should 
implement the following mechanism: 1) Report 
any possibility of fraudulent act, based on the 
sufficient accounting and finance control, to the 
prosecutors, which are Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK) and Indonesian Police 
Department; 2) The submission of the report 
should be made not later than 30 days after 
the result of internal investigation within the 
company; 3) Content of the report should 
consist of evidences81 supporting the report and 
specific details on the action being reported.82 
It’s important to note that companies should 
also be able to file their report themselves 
(through the Board of Directors) or represented 
by their legal counsel.
3. Government Incentives for Companies 
to Self-Report
When companies have filed their 
self-report, they should be eligible for 
certain benefits, in order to incentivize other 
companies to do the same. In order to be 
eligible, there are three conditions which must 
be fulfilled: 1) The company has fulfilled the 
80 See Jennifer Arlen, “The Potentially Perverse Effects of 
Corporate Criminal Liability”, The Journal of Legal Studies, 
1994, vol. 23, issue 2, 832-67.
81 Legal evidence materials are as stated in Article 184 of the 
Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code.
82 This should consist of: Name and position of the suspected 
person, including the detailed date and time  of the action being 
committed. If available, the specific timeline of actions taken 
prior to the fraudulent act should also be reported.
procedural requirements as proposed above; 
2) The company is proven have mitigated 
the damages of the bribery; 3) The company 
maintains its cooperative behavior throughout 
the process of investigation. This, for example, 
could be proven by taking enforcement actions 
(such as investigation, or disciplinary actions) 
in relation to the bribery. The authority to 
determine whether the company is eligible to 
receive the benefits is the Prosecutor, as the 
party to whom the report is addressed to or 
by Judges before criminal court (if the case 
proceeds to examination process before a 
criminal court) by the recommendation of the 
Prosecutor. As for the form of benefit of self-
report, we believe that the mechanism in UK 
DPA Code as explained above could be used as 
a reference, whereby there are 2 benefits:
- Lighter Punishment (decided by Judges 
in Criminal Court): This should be given 
in cases where the bribery amounts 
to serious bribery (of which KPK has 
the authority as the prosecutor), yet 
the company has fulfilled the three 
conditions above. The specific reduction 
in sanction shall be determined case-
by-case basis.
- Outside of Court Settlement (decided 
by the Prosecutor): This should be 
conducted in cases of non-serious 
bribery, where the company has 
fulfilled the three conditions above. 
The settlement itself could be done in a 
mediation process between Prosecutor 
and company, to determine the amount 
of fines imposed to the company.
As for the party receiving the benefit, 
it is the company that reports the bribery that 
receives the above-mentioned benefits, and 
not the employee who actively participates 
in the bribery (for example, if A works for 
Company ABC and bribes public official P, and 
such bribery is then reported by the company, 
Company ABC is the one that receives the 
benefit, and not A).
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CONCLUSION
By implementing our proposed solution, we 
believe that the efforts to prevent, mitigate, and 
sanction the criminal offence of bribery will 
further be strengthened, given that the self-
report mechanism and its benefits provide not 
only deterrence, but also rehabilitation for future 
commission of bribery. That way, the corporate 
culture to eliminate all forms of bribery is more 
embedded, and the top-level management of the 
company would have more leverage as well as 
incentives to take internal enforcement actions 
towards the perpetrators of bribery, given the 
benefits of self-reporting bribery committed 
by their employees, subsidiary, or others under 
their control.

